EUROPEAN ELECTIONS BRIEFING 2, April 1977 by unknown
IUIOPIII D 
ILBCTIOIS _0 
April 1977 
The British Government published its 'White Paper with green edges" on European Elect ions ("Direct Elections to the 
European Assembly", C1.1nd. 6768, 60p) on April 1. It concentrates on th& single most important matter still to be decided 
in this country if the elections .:re to be held, as planned, in May or June rn78: the electoral system to be used. 
The White Paper outlines three main possibilities: 
1. Simple Majority Sv~tem, but w~th STV 
in N. lrelanct 
England w ould be divided into 66 single-member seats, 
Scotland infO 8 and Wales into 4. 
These Euro-consti tuencies would be groupings of 8 to 10 
House of Commons constituencies, and would have 
roughly equal electorates. 
The Euro-constituency boundaries would be drawn up by 
the Parliamentc:-y Boundary Commissions following one 
round only of representations, but no local enquiries. 
Candidates' deposits would be £500, and 50 electors' 
signatures would be needed on nomination papers. 
Election would be bv simple majority, i.e. "first past 
the post". 
Northern Ireland, however, would be a single 3-Member 
seat, wfth voting by Single Transferable Vote (see below). 
2 . .'\. Regional List System 
The UK woulJ be divided into 11 electoral areas, based on 
the existing economic planning regions. Each would have 
more than one Member: 
Electoral Area Seats 
Scotland 
Wales 
N. Ireland 
SE England 
Gt. London 
S.W. England 
E. Anglia & 
E. Midlands 
W. Midlands 
N.W. England 
Yorks & Humb. 
N. England 
8 
4 
3 
14 
10 
6 
8 
7 
9 
7 
5 
Electorate 
(m) 
3.7 
2.0 
1.0 
7.0 
5.3 
3.1 
4.0 
3.7 
4.75 
3.6 
2.3 
Electorate 
per seat 
467,000 
508,000 
348.000 
503,000 
530,000 
517,000 
500,000 
531,000 
530,000 
508,000 
460,000 
Parties would put up lists of the appropriate number of 
candidates in each area. 
Voters would put an X against one candidate on the party 
list of their choice. 
The seats in each area would be allocated proportionately 
between the parties on the basis of the votes for each list 
(votes for a candidate are taken as votes for that 
candidate's party list). 
The seats allocated to each party would be filled according 
to the number of votes for each individual candidate. 
3. Single Transferable Votl3 m Mtdti-
Member Constitt·enr;ios 
The UK's 81 seats would be allocated to about a dozen 
constitutencies, each returning betvveen 3 and 70 
members. 
Wales and N. Ireland would each constitute a single 
constituency, of 4 and 3 Member:: respective!)' . Scotland 
would romprise "one or more" constituencies, totalling 8 
sea s . .;nglist, constituenciPS vvould be formed on thi:: basis 
of the economic planning regions, with modifications. 
Candidates would stand as individuals, but parties would 
probably put up the same number each as there were seats 
in the consituency. 
Voters would order some or all of the candidates by 
marking them 1, 2, 3, ... etc. 
Individual candidates would be elected according to the 
preferences (in some cases 2nd, 3rc', etc., preferences) of 
the voters. The result would probably, but not necessarily, 
be proportional as between parties. 
Possible distribition of seats between regions. 
A dual mandate? 
The White Paper also discusses the possibility of a 
compulsory dual mandate, i.e. only Members of the House 
of Commons would be able to stand for the European 
Parliament. Such a provision could be combined with any 
of the alternative electoral systems. 
V\ihat next? 
Before coming to a conclusion on the various options, the 
White Paper states, "the Government wishes to listen to 
the various views expressed in Parliament and elsewhere". 
According to the agreement between the Government and 
the Liberal Party, however, legislation for European 
E!ections " will be presented to Parliament in th is session" 
(i.e. befo re the Autumn ). 
In other Community countries, arrangements for the 
holding of European Elections are making steady progress 
(see back page). The firr.t coun ry to ratify the Community 
Act of September 20, 1976 wos Italy (Chnmber of Deruties 
on February 17, Senate on March /.9). 
The Government White Paper 
Her Majesty' s Government, the White Agreement will not come into force until all 
Paper observes in the introduction, "has member States have completed their 
undertaken to use its best endeavours to be respective constitutional r~quirements. " 
ready for ~fections ~Y . May/ June 1 ~!8." 3. A lthough tJ, .e is an "agreed intention" 
The Tre~t1es es_tablrshing t~e Europ1:an to hold tl ~t elections in May/ June 
Community provide for ~he direct eleet1on" 1978, "{he· -· greement provides for the 
of the European Parliament; and on Council, acting unanimously to 
September 20 last year an Agreement was determine the date of the first elections at a 
re~~hed by the ~ommunity's Council ?f later stage". 
Ministers. The White Paper draws especial . 
attention to the facts that : The White Paper also notes that, for the 
1. "The electoral procedures for these first 
direct elections should be governed by the 
national provisions of each member State. " 
2. "The substantive provisions of the 
United Kingdom , "there are fundamenta l 
constitutional issues involved in direct 
elections ... " , on which there should be 
"debate in Parliament and in the country" 
before legislation is int roduced. 
System of Election for the U.K. 
The system of voting to be used in the UK 
for the first European elections "presents a 
most difficult issue". On the one hand, the 
White Paper argues, our " distinctive elec-
toral system" has "stood the test of time 
and is well understood by the electorate at 
large and by the political Parties" . "The 
concept of the constituency is a funda-
mental part of our traditional electoral 
practice" ; and "the advantage of the single 
member constituency is that the elector 
votes for a particular candidate in the clear 
knowledge that the candidate who obtains 
the most votes will be elected and will act 
as his Member" . As far as the political 
Parties are concerned , " the selection of 
candidates tends to be de-centralised and 
exercised by the local constituency". 
On the other hand, if this traditional 
system of voting is adopted, there will be 
" significant differences between our pro-
cedure and that of the other eight 
countries", all of which will have some kind 
of Proportional Representation . Moreover, 
" the inherent characteristics of the British 
system" might produce some disturbing 
consequences: 
a ) Swings in electoral opinion tend to be 
magnified in terms of sears won or lost. In 
the context of Westminster elections "this 
is regarded by many as an advantage". But 
in the context of European Elections, where 
no Government is being elected, "it might 
be regarded as a less desirable feature". In 
general, the smaller the number of seats, 
the grea ter the possible disproportion 
between seats won and votes cast (see 
next page). 
b ) Thus, if the European Elections were 
held mid-way between General Elections to 
the House of Commons, there could be a 
wide divergence between the balance of 
power at Westminster and the Party 
composition of the UK Members of the 
European Parliament. This could lead to 
friction. 
The White Paper goes on to suggest that 
some of these problems could be resolved 
by adopting a system of proportional 
representat ion . Since the European Par-
liament " does not const itute a legislature or 
provide a government," PR for European 
Elections might not be open to the same 
objections as PR for W estminster elections . 
" A different institution might warrant a 
different form of election ." 
Alternative systems 
First, the White Paper considers various 
forms of PR through Party lists, which 
" would bring us into line with the majority 
of our European partners". There might be : 
1. A Single National List system, under 
which the whole of the UK would be 
considered a single constituency. (Each 
party would nominate up to 81 candidates, 
and electors would simply "vote the party 
ticket") . 
2. Separate lists for four national constitu-
encies: England, Scotland, Wales and N. 
Ireland. 
3. Regional lists (see page 1 ). 
The list system would have an added 
advantage: "the speed with which it could 
be brought into operation" . Any Boundary 
Commission procedures would be very 
limited. On the other hand, it would be " a 
major constitutional innovation, the conse-
quences of which are difficult to foresee ". 
The sort of constituency link we are used to 
would go, "giving the central or regional 
Party organisations a bigger ro le in nomi -
nating candidates" . Voters might take time 
to get accustomed to the new system. 
They "might be confused by the existence 
of separate procedures for national and 
European .elections, although the Northern 
Ireland electorate have coped with a similar 
situation since 1973" . Moreover, there 
might have to be yet another change when 
the uniform system of vot ing for the whole 
Community is introduced for the second or 
later elections. 
Secondly, the White Paper considers the 
Single Transferable Vote in multi -member 
constituencies, already used for some 
elections in N. Ireland . " This system gives 
maxim um influence to the elector, who is 
able to express a preference as between the 
different candidates of the Party of his 
choice as well as between the candidates of 
other Parties". The concept of the consti -
tuency would be retained , though they 
would be much larger; this would mean 
some kind of boundary procedure. STV 
would also give rise to the same problems 
of unfamiliarity, etc ., as the list system. 
Conclusions 
The White Paper does not make any 
decision on the electoral system. There are, 
however, a number of conclusions: 
1. "Whatever electoral system is used in 
the rest of the United Kingdom for direct 
elections .. . the special circumstances 
of Northern Ireland would make it 
appropriate for direct elections there to 
be conducted by a system of propor-
tional representation." 
2. Of the list systems, Regional lists are 
favoured . 
3. Whatever system is chosen, "it would be 
important to ensure a democratic pro-
cedure for the selection of candidates 
and to involve the constituency party 
organisations . .. ". 
Dual Mandate 
The White Paper discusses the possibility 
of combinin£1 any of the alternative: 
electoral systems with a compulsory dual . 
mandate.. This woDld me.an that an .elected · 
Membefr of the European Parliament would . 
also have to be a Member of the House of 
Commons (the White Paper does not 
mention the House of Lords). In effect , it 
would mean that all the candidates for 
European Elections would have to be sitting 
House of Commons Members. 
The advantages claimed for such an 
arrangement are: 
- the UK Members of the European Par-
liament would "have as their primary 
base their position at Westminster . .. "; 
- it would minimise the risk of divergen-
cies between the European Parliament 
Members and the Westminster Mem-
bers of the same party; 
it would "discourage the development 
in Britain of European parties with 
federalist aims which might undermine 
the position of our national parties". 
As against this, the White Paper notes 
that a compulsory dual mandate would : 
- impose considerable strain on the 81 
Members, who would be unable to play 
a full role in either Parliament; 
- give rise to considerable problems if an 
MP lost his seat at Westminster (since 
Westminster elections would not 
normally coincide with the 5-yearly 
European Elections); 
- involve proxy vo ting or automatic 
pairing at Westminster; 
- make it difficult for the Government 
parry at Westminster to find enough 
candidates, especially with single-
member constituencies. 
As the White Paper also notes, an 
elected European Parliament "is likely to 
have a more intensive scheme of business 
which pays little regard to the time of 
sittings of the various national legisla-
tures". And Conservative spokesman 
Douglas Hurd pointed out in the House of 
Commons on March 25 that "Hon . 
Members with a dual mandate have to 
divide their time in three parts - first in this 
House; second in the European Parliament; 
and third in aeroplanes and airport 
lounges" . 
Select Committee 
As outlined in European Elections 
Briefing 1, a Select Committee of the 
House of Commons has produced three 
reports on European Elections. It recom -
mended that the electoral system should be 
" first past the post" in single-member 
constituencies. The White Paper contains a 
commentary on the more important Com-
mittee recommendations . 
Matters common to all 
electoral systems. 
1. The Government accepts the Select 
Committee's division of the UK's 81 seats 
between t~e parts of the UK: England 66, 
Scotland 8, Wales 4, N. Ireland 3. 
2. o 'n the other hand it rejects giving the 
vote in European Elections either to 
nationals of other Community countries 
resident here, or to UK nationals resident 
abroad (other than service and diplomatic 
voters). This, the White Paper suggests, 
must w ait for a Speakers' conference. 
3. Consultation w ith the parties is promised 
on election expenses, but there is to be a 
free postal delivery of candidates' election 
addresses. 
4. The cost of the elections (estimated to be 
" at least £10 million") is to be met out of 
the Consolidated Fund . But "the Govern-
ment has not yet formed a view on whether 
candidates should receive any reimburse-
ment of their expenses from central funds". 
Matters applying to the simple 
majority system 
1. Single-member constituencies would be 
of roughly equal electorates, and be formed 
by grouping together Westminster consti -
tuencies, as recommended by the Select 
Committee. 
2. In this event, however, Northern Ireland 
would become a single, three-member 
constituency, with voting by STV. 
3. "The Government accepts that some 
curtailment of the full Parliamentary review 
procedures will be necessary for the first 
elections if they are to be held in May/ June 
1978." 
The White Paper considers three possi-
bilities: 
a) Boundary Commission recommenda-
tions following one round of represen-
tations and local enquiries (total time 
from legislation to Commission reports: 
"a minimum of 30 weeks"). 
b) Commission recommendations following 
one round of representations only (total 
time: "a minimum of 78 weeks") . 
c) Commission recommendations with no 
representations or enquiries (total time: 
"a minimum of9 weeks") . 
In view of the fact that "some six months 
will be needed to select candidates and 
prepare for the elections", the White Paper 
notes that the Commissions "will need to 
complete their work by the end of 1977". It 
therefore inclines in favour of option (b). 
4. The White Paper rejects the Select 
Committee recommendation for deposits 
of £150 per Westminster constituency (i.e . 
£1,200-£1 ,500), in favour of £500 irrespec-
tive of the Euro-constituency size. It also 
favours a flat-rate 500 signatures. 
Timetable 
The White Paper makes it clear that the 
timetable for European Elections will be 
affected by the choice of electoral system. 
If a system of single-member seats is 
chosen, for example, the deadlines will be: 
Royal Assent to Legislation: by end of 
August 1977 
Boundary Commission work: September-
December ( 18 weeks) 
Preparation by parties: January-June 1978 
(6months) 
A Single National List system would require 
no Boundary Commission work; and, for 
Regional Lists "even if Boundary Com-
mission procedures were necessary they 
would be less elaborate than would be 
required to define 81 new constituencies". 
On the other hand, the White Paper also 
makes clear that a list system "would be 
new to the United Kingdom and there 
would need to be a reasonable period of 
time for political parties, candidates and 
electors to learn about the workings of the 
new system" . Information and training 
would be needed for those who would be 
conducting the poll and the count. 
This would also be true of STV outside 
N. Ireland. In addition, this system would 
almost certainly involve work by the 
Boundary Commissions, though to a lesser 
extent than single-members seats. 
Proportional Representation 
If PR is held under a single national list 
system, the number of seats won by each 
party will be proportional to the votes cast 
for it. By contrast, if PR (or STV) is 
organised within two or more constitu-
encies (national areas, regions, etc.), the 
final result need not be proportional, 
though the result within each constituency 
will be. Many forms of PR, however, 
combine regional and national lists - for 
example, in Denmark. If the result of 
allocating seats at a regional level does not 
produce a proportional final result, the 
additional seats allocated at national level 
"top up" each party accordingly. 
Methods of counting 
Yet, except by an improbable freak, the 
distribution of seats under PR can never be 
"proportional" in a strictly mathematical 
sense. Either there would have to be the 
same number of seats as voters; or some 
individual MPs would be obliged to divide 
their loyalties proportionally between 
parties! 
A great deal therefore depends -
particularly for the smaller parties - on the 
practical formula used to convert votes cast 
into seats won. 
For example, the d'Hondt system of 
counting is used in some Community 
countries . This effectively involves dividing 
the total vote for each party successively by 
1, 2, 3, etc. Seats are then allocated among 
the resulting figures from the largest down. 
In strict mathematical terms, there is a 
slight bias towards larger parties. A similar 
method used in Denmark is the Sainte 
Lague . Here the divisors are 1, 3, 5, etc., 
which produces a slight bias in favour of 
smaller parties. Under the PR systems of 
most countries, however, seats are not 
allocated at -all to parties receiving under a 
certain percentage of votes (e.g. Germany 
5%; Denmark 2% ; Netherlands 0.627%). 
Counting under STV is done by the 
" Droop quota" method. As soon as a 
candidate has topped the requires total, he 
is elected and any "surplus" votes redistri-
buted according to the second preferences 
of al/ the voters for that candidate . If at any 
stage no candidate tops the quota, the 
bottom candidate drops out, and the votes 
redistributed. The process goes on until all 
the seats are filled. 
• r ;! 1 +1 , where n is the number of votes 
cast at any stage, and r is the number of seats 
to be filled. 
Candidates and the campaign 
Under the Single National List system 
outlined in the White Paper, votes would 
effectively be cast for party labels only. As 
far as the candidates went, a great deal 
would then depend on how high they were 
on their party lists. 
By contrast, under the Regional List 
system described by the White Paper, 
votes would be cast for only one candidate. 
This would mean that there would be 
competition, not merely between the 
parties, but also between the candidates of 
the same part y_ 
The same would be true of STV. In 
addition, parties would have to take into 
consideration the fact that second, third , 
fourth, etc., preferences might have an 
effect on the result. 
Results under different systems 
A number of studies have been made out-
lining the possible consequences of 
choosing alternative electoral systems. 
Most contain projections of the likely 
results under a system of simple majority in 
single-member seats. 
For example, The Economist of 30 
October 1976 published a possible list of 
constituencies (N . Ireland was not in-
cluded), which at the October election of 
1974 would have given the following result : 
England Scotland Wales N. Ireland TOTAL 
(66) (8) (4) (3) (87) 
Labour 32 6 4 42 
Conservative 34 34 
Liberal 0 
SNP 2 2 
(UUUC 3 3) 
This compares with probable results under Proportional Representation of: 
England Scotland Wales N. Ireland 
(3) 
TOTAL 
(87) (66) (8) 
Labour 27 3 
Conservative 26 2 
Liberal 13 1 
SNP 2 
uuuc 
SDLP 
Calculations have further been made as to 
the possible results given the electoral 
swings since October 1974. 
For example, Professor Michael Steed's 
pamphlet "Fair Elections or Fiasco?" 
(National Committee for Electoral Reform, 
26pp, 50p) suggests that if 20.5% of those 
who voted Labour in Scotland in October 
1974 switched to the SNP in 1978 (with no 
other changes taking place) the SNP would 
win all 8 seats under "first past the post" . 
The pamphlet also calculates the possible 
results in England and Wales, given the 
(4) 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
32 
29 
15 
2 
2 
1 
swing to Conservatives of the November 
1976 by-elections. Together, these give a 
possible European Election result : 
Simple majority PR 
Con. 65 43 
SNP 8 3 
Lab. 5 21 
uuuc 3 2 
Lib . 11 
SDLP 1 
Introducing European Elections in most 
Community countries involves two separ-
ate piece:; of legislation:-
1. Ratificauon of the Community Act 
signed on 20 September 1976. 
2. Passage of the necessary electoral law 
providing for voting system, constitu-
encies, etc. 
In the United Kingdom, the ratification of 
treaties is the prerogative of the Crown 
rather than of Parliament, so that legislation 
is not necessary. Mr Callaghan told the 
House of Commons on March 29, 1976 that 
ratification would be by simple affirmative 
resolution of both Housss of Parliament; 
and this will probably take place at the 
same time as the passuge of the implemen-
ting legislation. 
This means that the UI' is not as far 
behind other Community countries as is 
sometimes assumed. Although ratification 
is well advanced, most me at much the 
same stage as the UI~. in the introduction of 
the electoral law. 
Elecioral systems 
Article 7 of the Community Act states that, 
for the first elections at least, "the electorol 
procedure shall be governed in each 
Member State by its national provisions". 
This enables each country to adapt the 
system of election us~d to elect its national 
parliament, or to adopt a new one. 
Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and lreiand are like!y to adapt 
their national systems; France and Ger-
many are likely to adopt a system of 
National List PR instead. The United 
Kingdom could go either way. 
The later elections, a uniform system of 
voting will be used in all countries. 
of Ahe 
The four multi-member constituencies 
proposed for Ireland by the Irish Govern-
ment. Voting would be by Single Trans-
ferable Vote. 
Pay and conditions 
The financial and other conditions of 
service for directly elected Members ot the 
!=uropean Parliament are formall~, thP. 
responsibility of the European Parliament 
itself. The Parliament's Bureau is currently 
drawing up a draft statute, covering such 
matters as parliamentary privilege and 
salaries and expenses. 
No figure for salary has so far been fixed, 
though proposals have been made for a 
figure equivalent to about f.22,000 per 
annum. This would be subject to 
Community tax (marginal tax rates rise to 
45% on s2lariss over about £9,800 after 
deducting allowances.) 
in addition, Members will probatiy 
receive travel expenses, and a monthly sum 
for postag:,, secretc::rial assistance, etc. 
Money for political parties 
Each of the six currently established 
political groups in the European Parliament 
(see European Elections Briefing 1) are 
entitled to draw on Community funds for 
the employment of staff, research, publi-
cations, etc. European Elections raise the 
questions: 
To what extent will political parties receive 
Community funds? 
Will these be distributed through the 
political groups? 
How will they be divided between rhe 
nationcJ parties making up each group? 
How will paaies not represented in rhe 
groups (e.g. Plaid Cymru and the UUUC) 
receive tunds? 
The 1977 Budget contains an entry of 
about £833,000 to be divided among the 
political groups for a preliminary research 
and information programme. This will 
prcb3bly be divided among the groups in 
the following proportions: 
<}'a 
Sociulist 29.5 
Chnstian Democrat 23.8 
Liberal & Democrat 17.6 
Progressive Democrat 10.0 
Communist 10 O 
Conservative 9. 1 
The position in other countries, mid-April 1977 
Country Ratifica tion Electoral Law Probable System Comments 
Belgium In Parliamentary Under discussion Certainly PR. Dispute about whether single National elections 
Committee between parties national; separate Flemish and Walloon; on April 17 
or separate Flemish, Walloon and Brussels 
constituencies 
Denmark In Parliamentary In Parliamentary Certainly PR. Two constituencies: Denmark Danish national 
Committee. Committee. Expected and Greenland. Uncertainty about whether elections took place 
Expected in June in June. compulsory dual mandate in February 
Germany Bill announced Government proposals Government wants PR with single national Difficulties with 
March 31 announced constituency, no seats for parties polling Soviet Union over 
under 5%. Opposition CDU/CSU wants 3 Berlin seats 
regional (Land) constituencies 
France Expected June 15 Expected in Autumn PR with single national Communists and some 
constituency proposed by Gaullists oppose any 
Government European Elections 
Ireland Ratified on Government proposals 4 multi-member constituencies (see map) 
March 29 announced with STV 
Italy Ratified March 24 Under discussion PR with regional constituencies generally 
agreed 
Luxembourg Bill January. Under preparation PR with single national or two regional 
Legislation by Ministry of constituencies 
expected in June Interior 
Nethc lands Bill r-ebruary. Bill expected at PR with single national constituency National elections 
Legislation beginning of Summer on May 25 
expected in 
___ I Autumn 
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